The Benefits and Dangers of Synthetic Biology

A recent lecture and reading assignment introduced us to the rapidly expanding world of biological engineering. According to Biology’s Brave New World, this is a field of study where scientists are beginning a new era of rapid learning and progress. More concerning, however, is the lack of regulation and ethical study that has accompanied this wealth of technical innovation. Could this be another case of technology outstripping society’s capacity to address it? This is a complicated subject, and much of the research being performed in this area is known as dual-use, or capable of being exploited for a number of unintended purposes, both positive and negative. As biologists become engineers and the accessibility to genetic information grows, it will not be long before the general public has access to the tools and manufacturing services that allow new life to be designed. Concerns over this include the development and threat of biological warfare agents by motivated parties and individuals. Even if the most dangerous data and results were kept classified from the general public, the problem of information security then enters the scenario. The increasing ease of access to synthetic biology information and tools carries both advantages and disadvantages for society at large.

One advantage to this lower “barrier to entry” is the ability to perform rapid and inexpensive Intelligent Trial and Error (ITE). The cost of synthetic biological research has been plummeting in recent years. Every year, the cost of sequencing a genome drops 5 to 10 times further. This is well ahead of the rate predicted by Moore’s law, and as of January 2014, has dropped below $1000 (Business Insider, 2014). Sequencing is not the only field in which costs have dropped, however. The synthetic biology competition iGEM (Internationally Genetically Engineered Machines) has existed since 2003, and provides resources and structure to allow high school and college students to design and grow their own genetically engineered life. The competition promotes the development of sophisticated bacteria, with the complexity increasing all the time. Impressively, this competition operates on an annual basis, proving that substantial design improvements and changes can be implemented on a short time frame. Speeding the process even further is the development of automated assembly processes, which could supplement or replace typical standard assembly and parallel assembly techniques. Fast turn-around is essential to the iteration process of ITE, and the ability for minimally funded student teams to produce work so quickly is strong evidence that professional teams could evolve designs even faster. Crucially, iGEM gives access to a Registry of Standard Biological Parts, a standardized source of common biological components needed to allow for rapid (and relatively simple) development of completely new genetic recipes. In the case of iGEM, many of the components are assembled as “BioBricks”, which can be used in designs and supplemented by software to increase the ease of engineering (igem.org). With the numerous standards and technologies in place, increased speed of the bacteria assembly process, and tremendous drop in price of genetic research and components, intelligent trial and error can be performed faster and more consistently to help negate the unexpected consequences of rapid innovation.

While technological advances may provide some solutions, they can also come at a cost. Although increased accessibility to biological engineering may promote more testing and positive outcomes in the professional scientific community, it could also draw less well intentioned interest from others. The process of hazardous bacteria development would not be particularly difficult for a terrorist group. Machinery used in automatic assembly could be easily reverse engineered or purchased though illegitimate channels. In some cases, this is a simple as automated pipette and fluid transfer robots. Not only are such robots easy to acquire, but publicly available code already exists that can be used to program them (Synthetic Biology, 2011). The secondary concern is one of information and data. Equipment for building new bacteria is only as useful as the genetic code sent to it, and it is this code that presents such a large security risk in the future. While the ability to engineer deadly biological weapons may remain out of reach for most of society, replicating existing code is simple if it becomes accessible. This is a system with no redundancy; if classified genetic code were to be released, it would be almost impossible to prevent the spread of the knowledge. This has been seen time and time again through “leak sites” like Wikileaks.org. Another problem presented by Biology’s Brave New World is the potential for dangerous code to be hidden in innocuous places. If such code was unknowingly downloaded to a system with access to automated assembly machinery, the consequences could be devastating. The dangers of information security and the susceptibility of assembly machinery counter many of the advantages of biological engineering with matching disadvantages. It will be up to society and regulation agencies to decide what rate of innovation in the fledgling field is worth the risk.

Cited Sources

"Biology's Brave New World."Foreign Affairs. 12 Apr. 2015. Web. 12 Apr. 2015. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140156/laurie-garrett/biologys-brave-new-world>.

Raj, Ajai. "Soon, It Will Cost Less To Sequence A Genome Than To Flush A Toilet - And That Will Change Medicine Forever." Business Insider. Business Insider, Inc, 02 Oct. 2014. Web. 12 Apr. 2015. <http://www.businessinsider.com/super-cheap-genome-sequencing-by-2020-2014-10>.

"Main Page - Ung.igem.org." Main Page - Ung.igem.org. N.p., n.d. Web. 12 Apr. 2015. <http://igem.org/Main_Page>.

Leguia, Mariana, ‡ Jennifer Brophy, Douglas Densmore, and . Christopher J. Anderson. "Chapter 16." Synthetic Biology. San Diego, CA: Academic, 2011. N. pag. Print.